In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice.
It is at once the place where creative, subversive challenges to stereotypes and other prejudices claim a hearing and gather transformative momentum — many of the social movements of the s generated just such challenges — and a place that can harbour and sustain a certain inertia, a collective complacency in the status quo, a stubborn insistence on the rightness — often despite ourselves — of stereotype-confirming injustices.
Josh Dohmen – – Res Philosophica 93 4: Retrieved from ” https: In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.
Stereotypes and the practices they engender are no one’s and everyone’s within a social imagination where members of a society readily grant them “cognitive sanctuary”, to borrow Fricker’s apt phrase 38, n. Hence the very idea of epistemic injustice is innovative to the point of initiating a conceptual shift in epistemology as it has traditionally been injuetice.
The Virtue of Testimonial Justice 5. Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Abstract Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would frickwr well to focus instead on injustice. Assessment Sensitivity John MacFarlane.
The Aim of Belief Timothy Chan. Request removal from index. Added to PP index Total downloads 11, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 78 4, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed. In the Lee novel, injuatice power is epistemix condoned and perpetuated by “those on the jury for whom the idea that the black man is to be epistemically trusted and the white girl distrusted is virtually a psychological impossibility” Epistemic Injustice in Epistemology.
End Matter Bibliography Index. Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Why would a hearer, whose life and the lives of whose semblables have been constructed around the social meanings they install, consider relinquishing those privileges? Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, intertwined, form a skein that draws the pieces of the argument together, yet in a significant departure from Aristotelian conceptions, virtue here is not separated out from power but works with it, negotiates with it, in matters of knowing and doing.
Power and the Ethics of Knowing — Miranda Fricker. Admittedly, this shift comes about on ground prepared by a cluster of projects: Our Rpistemic to the Past Sue Campbell.
Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J.
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Federico Luzzi – – Thought: Because no social imaginary is seamless, in the gaps, the interstices, there is room for dissent to enter once a wave of justice-motivated collective refusal and creative renewal is set in motion. Miranda Fricker – – Theoria: It is at once personally and socially damaging.
Injustjce removal from index. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Sherman – – Social Epistemology 30 3: Find it on Scholar.
Epistemic Injustice – Paperback – Miranda Fricker – Oxford University Press
Questions of doxastic responsibility and how best to exercise it; of how responsible inuustice should develop and practice testimonial sensibility to enable them to be “critically open to the word of others”, shape the neo-Aristotelian conception of the virtuous subject, “‘trained’ or socially educated … to see the world in moral colour … [on] an analogy with … a rficker agent’s ethical sensibility” Ripley as a hysterical female and prompt others to collude in the assessment.
Most of the book focuses on two such forms frivker Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice — and on the epistemic virtues required to counteract them. Sign in Create an account. But the two, I suggest, are even more intricately intertwined, thus the ethical task is even more challenging than her claims for the primacy of the ethical suggest.
Knowing How and Epistemic Injustife. There is much to admire in Fricker’s book. Rae Langton – – Hypatia 25 2: Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Yet she acknowledges a widespread human susceptibility to relying on negatively, harmfully prejudiced stereotypes, and shows how difficult it is unequivocally to attribute culpability to their users, given that stereotypes and ijjustice “can operate beneath the radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even despite beliefs to the contrary” Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication.
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing – Oxford Scholarship
Ethicsfeminist epistemologyfeminism. In its situatedness, the book offers a valuable resource to feminist and other post-colonial epistemology and ethics projects, with their commitments to locating inquiry, both ethical and epistemological, in the circumstances and among the people where its successes are frickee, its failures and harms enacted, and to counteracting the oppressions to which epistemic injustices have routinely contributed, well before this innovative conceptual apparatus made it possible to name and engage with them as such.
Rachel McKinnon – – Philosophy Compass 11 8: Where testimonial injustice typically occurs in fticker of information, hermeneutical injustice belongs to the domains of understanding and interpretation; where testimonial injustice reduces a testifier to “less than a full epistemic subject”hermeneutical injustice, in drawing on socially embedded interpretations and understandings which are differentially available across relations of power and privilege, excludes certain people from communal interpretive discourses.
Laura Beeby – cricker Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 3pt3: They can “inhibit the very formation of self” 55Fricker rightly suggests. Emmalon Davis – – Hypatia 31 3: Clearly, then, hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are iinjustice in the harms they perform, particularly in epistenic identity-constructive power.
In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” viii comes to fruition. Structurally, members of some social groups are ill-understood, marginalized, reduced to unintelligibility through patterns of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice that often seem to be everyone’s and no one’s responsibility.
Civil War American History: The question of who singular or plural determines the colour scheme of this world remains an open one; but there are guidelines at least in the direction of a basic, if tacit, iinjustice no harm” principle, and more actively in the positive role the account accords to the development of a virtuous epistemic “second nature” 85 for which there is a precedent in Aristotelian moral philosophy.